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Book Reviews
JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD. Edited by Margaret K. Rosen-
heim. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 1962. Pp. 240.
$6.95.
Sixty-four years ago, women of the Catholic Visitation and Aid Society
in Chicago became deeply concerned about children in jails and in crimi-
nal courts. They sought the aid of the Chicago Woman's Club and together
tried to do something about these children. This social service society and
civic organization pressured the Chicago Bar Association to help them
carry out their campaign to set up separate court facilities for juveniles.
On July 1, 1899, the first juvenile court was established in Cook County,
Illinois. This new American institution was hailed by Charles Chute of
Probation and Parole fame as one of the greatest child welfare advance-
ments in a century. Roscoe Pound heralded the juvenile court movement
that was begun in Chicago as the most significant landmark in the advance
of criminal procedure since Magna Carta.
Today we are still concerned with children and their involvement with
law enforcement agencies. Juvenile delinquency has become a national
problem. The statistics on "teenage crime" are high-too high for a society
that prides itself on being so affluent.
In recent years a great deal of literature has been written about juvenile
delinquency and juvenile courts. Few books, however, are as thoughtful or
include material with as much insight into problem areas of the juvenile
court as Justice for the Child, a compilation of articles that was an out-
growth of conferences held at the University of Chicago and sponsored by
its School of Social Service Administration.
There are certain perennial problems in the juvenile court, writes Mrs.
Margaret K. Rosenheim, the editor of the book: what should the role of
the court be? what specialized service should it offer and what training
should its personnel have? what kind of procedure ought to characterize
its operations? The writers have attempted to offer answers to these diffi-
cult questions.
There are various levels of delinquent behavior. There are problems
even in defining "delinquency", "neglect", and "dependency" as Professor
Monrad Paulsen points out in his article, "The Delinquency, Neglect,
and Dependency Jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court." One major problem
in this field is when to invoke the jurisdiction of a court rather than to seek
some other remedy. When is a problem a "court problem" rather than one
requiring parental discipline, school discipline or referral to a child guid-
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ance clinic? When an infant engages in childish pranks, one is reluctant to
suggest that the child ought to undergo a court experience. But when
pranks take on serious overtones, or a child has a history of serious anti-
social behavior, then the matter becomes complex. Paul Tappan, in his
article, "Juridical 8c Administrative Approaches to children with Prob-
lems," writes:
Court power should be employed only in those cases that require the
application of authority, restraint, or correctional supervision. Exer-
cise of legal authority should be predicated upon a scrupulous deter-
mination that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct of a char-
acter seriously threatening to the community or that he has suffered
from the willful neglect of his parents.'
Mr. Tappan's remarks are, of course, related to the instances when a
child faces legal proceedings. "Court power", or what he later refers to as
"juridical control", is the power to control actions, to deprive a parent of
the childs custody, to deprive a child of his liberty by institutionalizing
him. These are the extreme or serious cases. But not all cases brought to
the attention of a juvenile court end up with the child's being institution-
alized. Howard Fradkin, in his article, "Disposition Dilemmas of American
Juvenile Courts," discusses in great detail the kinds of disposition available
in the juvenile court setting. These are intake, informal, and formal dispo-
sitions. To Mr. Fradkin, the intake disposition includes those situations in
which the intake worker screens complaints and allegations brought to the
attention of the court by police, truant officers, parents, friends or neigh-
bors and disposes of the case by dismissing it, placing the child in a deten-
tion home pending court action, releasing the child to his parents with
instructions to return to the court at some later date for an official hearing,
or placement on "unofficial probation" with or without the consent of the
parents. Mr. Fradkin writes that about one-half of all cases reaching the
juvenile court are dismissed at the intake level of disposition. Ordinarily
the intake worker is a trained social worker. Informal disposition refers to
cases in which a treatment disposition has been made by the juvenile court
judge without the filing of a petition and a legal adjudication. A formal
disposition includes dismissal, probation and institutionalization, and is
made by the judge after a judicial proceeding.
The life of a child is involved in each decision that is made. When a
policeman makes his decision to take a child into custody, or not to take
him into custody, he is taking a serious step. Does he know what is involved
if he refers a case to the juvenile court? Paul Keve discusses police involve-
ment in the juvenile court process in his article, "Administration of Juve-
nile Court Services." Mr. Keve points out that the court has an educational
function to play with the police. He wisely states that while the court has
1 JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 166-67 (Rosenheim ect. 1962).
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no responsibility to inform the police of the disposition it makes on a par-
ticular case, it ought to report back to the police department the actions it
has taken on cases referred to it by the police. A great many of the "molly-
coddling" remarks made by police and public in their discussion of juve-
nile court decisions are based on a misunderstanding of the kinds of dispo-
sitions that a court can and does make. "A close working relationship and
regular reciprocal communication on cases between court and police
promote a mutual respect," writes Mr. Keve.2
The decisions of the police are out-of-court decisions. What about de-
cisions made by the intake workers and the judges? Are these people
trained to make them? As for the intake workers and probation workers,
there is a great dearth of trained people for these positions. Schools of
social work have been slow to promote this area of their curricula. While
one can appreciate the generic approach to social work education, there
is an important distinction between doing casework in a child guidance
clinic, for example, and casework in a juvenile court setting. Paul Tappan
writes:
Courts are employed to deal with delinquency in part because illegal
aggression has a peculiar significance for official action: it is sui geners.
A juvenile court must determine what measure, if any, of social dan-
gerousness is manifested in a child's conduct. It is concerned with re-
ducing the probability that a violator will offend again or that others
will follow his example. Thus the juvenile court is concerned with
what the child has done as well as with what he is. The nature of his
illegal act, together with his prior history of violations and the circum-
stances surrounding his offence, are the best evidence of the present
and future threat that he poses to the community. An agency that is
interested only in its client's welfare and adjustment is not oriented
to the nuclear problem of lawlessness. Because the problem of delin-
quency and its treatment is qualitatively distinct from that involved
in other forms of maladjustment, a juvenile court system tends to pro-
duce more apposite and effective treatment of the antisocial and ag-
gressive juvenile. The court employes correctional measures utilizing
authority as a central and suitable feature of treatment in order to
achieve its ultimate goal of social protection. Both the theory and
techniques involved differ from those applied to other forms of prob-
lem behavior or pathological situation.3
Social work educators can profit greatly from the chapter by Mr. Tappan
and the one entitled "Court and Community" written by Professor Alfred
Kahn.
For years the caliber of juvenile court judges has not been high. In
some states politicians have used the juvenile court judgeship as a patron-
age post. Usually the appointment has been a disappointment to the new
2 Id. at 195.
3 Id. at 154-55.
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judge. In some places welfare directors appoint judges. It has only been in
recent years that there has been serious concern for filling the position of
juvenile court judge with a truly qualified person. What are these qualifi-
cations?
I support Mr. Fradkin when he writes:
The judge needs training and background in the social sciences in
order to render an intelligent decision concerning primary disposition
matters, that is, whether the child is to be treated at home under a pro-
bation agreement or whether the child should be given intensive treat-
ment by the professional staff of an institution.4
Mr. Fradkin does not put much faith in self-education. Instead he calls
upon law schools to require applicants for admission to have had a heavy
concentration in the social sciences in their undergraduate training. I
think this recommendation is an unworkable limitation. The responsi-
bility for preparing people for the bench rests primarily on law schools and
in legal education. The content of courses in family law and criminal law
would bear directly on juvenile court problems. So long as those courses
are taught in the traditional manner-case by case analysis without the
benefit of material from other disciplines-they will have little impact on
the training for a juvenile court judgeship. Elsewhere I have recommended
that law schools abandon their parochial approach to the teaching of
family law.5 It is encouraging to see that Yale, Pennsylvania and Minne-
sota are making efforts to rethink the teaching and content areas of family
law.
Even though Mr. Fradkin makes light of self-education, I think there
are values in it. By daily becoming involved with the cases a juvenile court
judge hears, he certainly must gain insight into human relations. The edu-
cation from this involvement is probably worth much more than a few
courses in psychology.
Training for juvenile court judgeships and workshops for the judges
are being conducted by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
The judge soon to be appointed, along with judges who are presently
sitting on the bench, are given short-term courses in the form of institutes
and conferences in human growth and development, court procedure,
special case analysis and other problems intimately connected with the
judge's function. This educational program undertaken by the National
Council is a most hopeful development.
Juvenile court procedure has been a serious problem. It has been the
subject of controversies between judge and lawyer and between lawyer
and social worker. On the one hand, there must be a continuation of the
Id. at 132.
Katz, The Lawyer and the Caseworker: Some Observations, 42 SOCIAL CASEWORK
10 (1961).
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underlying philosophy and program of the court-that of treating the
youngster as a juvenile offender, not a criminal. On the other hand, the
child brought before the court ought to be afforded a fair and proper hear-
ing. One thing is certain: the courts of this country are in agreement that
a proceeding against a child in a juvenile court is not a "criminal pro-
ceeding" within those provisions of the Constitution which prescribe
certain standards and procedures for "criminal proceedings." The im-
portant question, however, is this: how much of the juvenile court pro-
ceeding should be formal with constitutional safeguards that are present
in adult criminal courts and how much of the juvenile court proceeding
should be informal?
Writers in Justice for the Child have taken various positions in their
discussion of the proper kind of proceeding that should be available in the
juvenile court and of the juvenile offender's civil liberties. Dr. Elliot Studt,
in his article, "the Client's Image of the Juvenile Court," cautions against
a strictly informal proceeding. To him the symbolic value of the juvenile
court would be lost if there were "too great a disparity between the infor-
mality of the process and the seriousness of what actually happens in the
life of the family."6 He calls for a formal procedure:
the placing of each actor in relation to another, the way of addressing
each actor, the order in which topics are discussed, the rules that gov-
ern discussion, and the differentiation of one phase of action from
another-to communicate through dramatic action what verbal ab-
stractions can never communicate in full.7
Formal procedure calls for specific safeguards. It suggests the use of
the adversary system. This is what Mr. Alex Elson calls for in his article,
"Juvenile Courts and Due Process." To Mr. Elson, the "decision based on
the product of contesting forces is sounder, and hence fairer, than decisions
based on unilateral investigation, even if court supervised."s Judge Alex-
ander would qualify that statement by saying that the "contesting forces"
should be lawyers with social consciences. He writes in his chapter on "Con-
stitutional Rights in Juvenile Court":
When... a lawyer appears [in a juvenile court proceeding] who pos-
sesses no social conscience or is constitutionally contentious or vainly
legalistic or mentally myopic, he seems impelled to earn his fee by put-
ting on a show for his client. He must win his case by hook or by crook,
"spring the kid," and get for his clients what they want regardless of
ultimate consequences to child or family. Since, as a rule there is no
counsel to oppose him, he frequently succeeds-but to what end? So
that the child can further pursue his deliquent ways? ... To correct
a defiant, disturbed delinquent is at best a difficult, delicate process.
* Rosenheim, op. cit. supra note 1, at 204.
* Id. at 205-06.
aid. at 97.
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To insist on such a legal bull in a china shop is surely dubious due
process.9
Mr. Elson calls for an extensive use of procedural safeguards in the
juvenile court proceeding. However, he cautions that they should not be
used at the expense of contravening the underlying philosophy of the
court. He wants due process safeguards built into the present procedure.
The principal due process safeguards that he advances under the heading
of safeguards that do not involve the hearing or decisional process have to
do with limitations on detention practices, prohibitions against criminal
prosecution for offenses already tried in the juvenile court and provisions
concerned with confidentiality of records. The second group of safeguards
involves the hearing and decisional process. These include: right to coun-
sel, separation of determination of jurisdiction and fact-finding from dis-
position, application of some rules of evidence, hearing made a prerequi-
site to transfer of the jurisdiction of the child to a criminal court, and
requirement of a hearing prior to the modification of a decree and strength-
ening the right to appeal.
Judge Alexander would take issue with Mr. Elson's extensive formal
procedural requirements. Like Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, 10 he believes
that the due process to which an infant is entitled is a process suitable to his
status and his substantive rights. Judge Alexander points out that the "Bill
of Rights was essentially designed to deal with adversary. proceedings in
criminal courts and, consequently, does not readily fit into the picture of
the juvenile courts."" To Judge Alexander, the juvenile court proceeding
should be "a nonadversary, nonpunitive, solicitous approach aimed to
protect and correct the child malefactor."'12
Judge Orman W. Ketcham takes an unusual approach to the problem
of due process and the juvenile court proceeding. In his chapter, "The
Unfulfilled Promise of the American Juvenile Court," he advances what
he calls "The Mutual Compact Theory of Parens Patriae in America."
Essentially it is this:
This compact authorizes the juvenile court, in its discretion, to sub-
stitute state control for parental control. But such an intrusion of
governmental supervision rests on the assumption that the state will
act in the best interests of the child and that its intervention will en-
hance the child's welfare. Applying the contractual analogy, it follows
that, unless the state satisfactorily preforms its obligations under the
compact, the juvenile and his parent should have a right to consider
the agreement broken and insist upon their full constitutional rights.
9Id. at 89.
20 Prettyman, Three Modern Problems in Criminal Law, 18 WAsH. & LEE L. REv.
187, 199 (1961).
1Rosenheim, op. cit. supra note 1, at 84.
-Id. at 85.
BOOK REVIEW
In other words, if the state fails to make good its promise to act for the
improvement of the child's welfare, the child and his parents may de-
mand the full protection of criminal due process afforded adults
charged with crime.13
One comes away from reading Justice for the Child hopeful about the
juvenile court problems in America. There is hope because intelligent and
thoughtful people in key positions are concerned with the juvenile court
system and are engaging in useful discussions advancing new and some-
times unorthodox ideas. Judge Ketcham's conclusions and recommenda-
dons are inspiring:
If the juvenile court experiment is not to be swept away by the tide
of legal history, those interested in its philosophy must strongly urge
(1) that legislatures provide juvenile courts with sufficient trained
judges and adequate .professional staff to dispose patiently yet expedi-
tiously of all cases referred to them; (2) that juvenile court procedures
that afford due process and fair treatment for the child and his parent
and prevent the unwarranted intervention of overzealous representa-
tives of the state in the private lives of such individuals be formulated
by bar associations and put into universal application; (8) that pro-
cedures for assessing the needs of children coming before these courts
be developed by behavioral scientist; and (4) that the state appropri-
ate sufficient funds for the prompt construction and adequate staffing
of institutions truely designed to provide delinquent and dependent
juveniles the care, guidance, and discipline that should have been
provided by their parents.14
When these things are done, we can be assured of justice for the child.
SANFoRD N. KATZ*
1 Id. at 26.
14 Id. at 38-39.
0 Associate Professor, The Catholic Univ. of America School of Law.
